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Abstract
After a century in the making, the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
came into existence in 2002 with an overwhelming number of states 
ratifying the Rome Statute. With 34 signatories, Africa is the largest 
contributor in the Assembly of State Parties, yet Africa has become its 
severest critic. As threats of withdrawal become a reality with the imminent 
withdrawal of Burundi, this article considers the question of whether Africa 
has an alternative solution. With an African Union (AU) Constitutive 
Act purporting a commitment to combating impunity and promoting 
democracy, rule of law and good governance, one would expect the AU 
to be ready to pick up the reins. To end impunity and hold perpetrators 
accountable, finding an alternative for the lacuna left in the absence of the 
ICC has never been more pressing. The recent adoption of a strategy by 
African countries for a mass withdrawal has pushed the matter to the fore. 
This article discusses the feasibility of amnesty, domestic and local trials, 
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or an African regional court as viable alternatives to ICC jurisdiction and 
prosecution. The creation of an African regional court in the guise of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Right (ACJHR) seems the preferred 
solution, enabled by the Malabo Protocol extending its jurisdiction to 
international and transnational crimes. Slow ratification does not bode 
well for the proposed ACJHR and its extended jurisdiction. Time is of the 
essence and whatever solution is found will necessitate decisive action by 
the AU.
Keywords: ICC, African Union, African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights, impunity, amnesty, regional courts
Historical background
The idea behind the establishment of the permanent International 
Criminal Court (ICC) was debated nearly a century ago (Schabas 2014:171). 
To promote the affirmative conclusion several states entered into a number 
of treaties, but few were signed. Consequently, the treaties were never 
forcefully implemented. Where states were able to reach consensus, it 
culminated in a number of ad hoc international tribunals being formed to 
delve into atrocities and infringements of human rights committed during 
conf licts in the world (Bassiouni 1997:11).
After World War I, despite attempts under the Treaty of Peace with 
Germany [Treaty of Versailles] of 1919 to haul former German Emperor 
Kaiser William II before an international tribunal, only a few German 
officers faced the German Supreme Court at Leipzig. Germans viewed this 
prosecution with scepticism since war crimes were committed by both 
sides (Bassiouni 1991:2).
The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and 
on Enforcement of Penalties was formed pursuant to the 1919 Paris 
Peace Conference. Citing atrocities by Turkish forces against Armenians 
as a violation of ‘laws of humanity’ and deserving of punishment, the 
Commission recommended the prosecution of those implicated by a 
proposed international tribunal (Meron 2006:555). The United States 
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opposed the idea, contending inter alia that the ‘laws of humanity’ were 
imprecise (Meron 2006:556). Another unsuccessful attempt was made 
by the never ratified Treaty of Sevres (Meron 2006:558), followed closely 
by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 exonerating Turkish forces implicated 
in atrocities by granting them amnesty (Bassiouni 1991:3). The Allies’ 
compromise seemed to be politically motivated since the Turkish ruling 
elite, being partial to the western powers, was needed to control the 
Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits through which the Russian Navy could 
reach the Mediterranean (Bassiouni 1991:17).
The assassination of Prince Alexander of Yugoslavia prompted the adoption 
of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism by 
the League of Nations in 1937 (United Nations General Assembly Law 
Commission 1949), its Protocol providing for the establishment of an 
international criminal tribunal which never came into force – as only India 
ratified it (Bassiouni 1991:4).
Two ad hoc international military tribunals, the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East, followed in the wake of the World War II atrocities. A number 
of factors led to criticism of these tribunals, in particular the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, which was seen as a selective prosecution which favoured the 
allied forces, and was accordingly lambasted as nothing but ‘Victors’ 
Justice’ (Economides 2003:34). Professor Christopher Blakesley (1994:80) 
argues that crimes committed by Soviets against minorities in Poland 
and the Baltic states could have been easily classified as ‘crimes against 
humanity’. He questions the failure to haul Allied forces before tribunals 
notwithstanding the heinous acts committed in Tokyo, Dresden, Hiroshima 
or Nagasaki.
The continued quest to establish an international tribunal can be traced 
through post-World War II conventions such as the Geneva Convention on 
the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 which 
contained a provision predicting the establishment of the ICC by expressly 
recognising the jurisdiction thereof.
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Lessons learnt
The Nuremberg and Tokyo prosecutions inf luenced the United Nations 
(UN) debate on the establishment of a permanent international court – a 
process that continued until it was stalled during the cold war era (Dugard 
2011:171). Momentum was regained in 1989, following Trinidad and 
Tobago’s motion to combat drugs and trafficking through the establishment 
of an International Criminal Court, when the United Nations General 
Assembly sanctioned the International Law Commission to develop a draft 
statute for an International Criminal Court (Schabas 2014:188). At its 46th 
session, the Commission adopted the formal draft and handed it over to the 
General Assembly for deliberation (Dugard 2011:171; Crawford 1995:404).
It was amidst the development of the draft statute that the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) was obliged to establish an ad hoc tribunal to deal 
with the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia. In May 1993, they 
adopted resolution 827 authorising the Tribunal to deal with individuals 
implicated in the transgressions of International Humanitarian Law 
(Schabas 2001:11). After the Rwandan genocide, the UNSC adopted resolution 
955 in November 1994 in response to Rwanda’s call for the establishment 
of an ad hoc tribunal to deal with those deemed liable for the atrocities 
committed in Rwanda and its neighbouring states (Schabas 2001:11).
In spite of their shortcomings, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals served 
as a foundation upon which the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) were established (Meron 2006:559). Prof John Dugard 
asserts that ‘the Rwanda and Yugoslav Tribunals furthered the widespread 
belief that a permanent international criminal court was desirable and 
practical’ (Dugard 2011:172).
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The Rome Statute 
Intense negotiations lasting five weeks in Rome signalled an end to the 
longest protracted process of drafting and agreeing on the Statute for the 
ICC (Economides 2003:37). States, Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) and activists’ groups were to ensure that ‘the long held dream of the 
ICC [would] now be realised’ (Economides 2003:29). The primary aim of 
the ICC was to put a halt to impunity for perpetrators of the most egregious 
crimes and violations of human rights of international concern. Despite 
the heated debate surrounding many of these issues, ranging from fears 
of states that their sovereign rights would be impinged to concerns that 
the Statute conf licted with their foreign policies, a group of like-minded 
states, including Germany and Canada, pushed for ‘a very powerful ICC 
with primacy over state practice’ (Economides 2003:45; Benedetti et al. 
2014:65).
The Statute of the ICC was adopted on 17 July 1998 by an overwhelming 
majority of states attending the Rome Conference. The Treaty (United 
Nations 1998) was adopted after 120 states voted in favour of adoption. 
Only China, Israel, Iraq, and the United States voted against it, and 
21 abstained. By the 31 December 2000 deadline, 139 states had signed 
the treaty and by 11 April 2002, it had been ratified by 66 states (Benedetti 
et al. 2014:173). To date it has been ratified by 122 states, of which 34 
are African.1
Situation and investigations
Since the ICC’s inception, all the warrants against implicated persons have 
been issued against Africans although preliminary investigations have been 
conducted throughout the world, namely, Ukraine, Iraq/United Kingdom, 
Columbia, Afghanistan and Georgia. In Georgia the Prosecutor opened a 
1 The latest ratification status is available from: <https://asp.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/asp/
pages/asp_home.aspx> [Accessed 4 February 2017].
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proprio motu2 investigation on 27 January 2016 over ‘alleged crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed in the context of an armed conf lict 
between 1 July and 10 October 2008’ (Office of the Prosecutor 2016; Gegout 
2013:808). The Prosecutor is yet to issue indictments as a result of ongoing 
preliminary investigations (Office of the Prosecutor 2016).
While Palestine was accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC on 1 January 2015 
and acceding to the Rome Statute on 2 January 2015, the Prosecutor opened 
a preliminary examination for atrocities in Palestine and East Jerusalem 
since 13 June 2014. Following the 2009 military coup of José Manuel 
Zelaya Rosales, the President of Honduras, the ICC instituted preliminary 
investigations on crimes committed during the post-coup period; however 
on 28 October 2015, the Prosecutor closed the preliminary examination 
citing lack of reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation (Office of 
the Prosecutor 2016). In 2014, the ICC Prosecutor, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, 
re-opened the preliminary examination of the situation in Iraq, aimed 
at analysing alleged crimes attributed to the armed forces of the United 
Kingdom deployed in Iraq between March 2003 and July 2009 (Office of 
the Prosecutor 2016).3
These preliminary investigations outside the African region serve to 
demonstrate the Court’s preparedness to take on cases beyond Africa, 
thereby dispelling the myth that the ICC only focuses on situations in Africa.
Concerns raised by African countries
Africa is the largest regional grouping of countries within the ICC’s 
Assembly of States (Murithi 2012:4). The idea of an autonomous apolitical 
international court attracted overwhelming support on the African 
continent (McNamee 2014:5). In spite of the perceived support of the ICC 
2 Kaul (2010) states that under Arts 13 (c) and 15 of the Rome Statute, the prosecutor is 
empowered to initiate investigations ex officio solely based on his or her own appreciation 
of a certain situation or information (Art. 15 (3)–(5) Rome Statute). 
3 According to the OTP report dated November 2016, the Prosecutor is in the process of 
gathering factual evidence in order to establish if there were atrocities committed during 
armed conflict in Iraq which may lead to indictment of those implicated. 
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and its ideals, it became clear that a number of African countries have 
now turned hostile towards the very institution it has pledged to support. 
Forerunners of this hostility seem to have come from the AU, the one 
organisation that represents all the countries on the African continent 
(Murithi 2012:4). This is an organisation whose Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights very clearly states in the preamble that signatories will 
‘coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better 
life for the peoples of Africa and ... promote international cooperation 
having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’, and further recognises that human beings 
are entitled to ‘national and international protection’.
These principles are further repeated in the AU’s Constitutive Act as its 
objectives ‘encourage international co-operation’ and ‘promote and protect 
human and people’s rights’ in accordance with the Charter of the UN and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (African Union 2000).4
A number of high-profile, much publicised incidents have precipitated 
a change from initial support of the ICC to the AU’s current hostile 
stance. The indictment of the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir by the 
ICC Prosecutor and the African countries’ perceived5 refusal to assist 
in his arrest was followed by the indictment of Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta 
and William Ruto who were subsequently elected president and deputy-
president respectively. It has been argued that Africa’s hostility should 
not be seen as a rejection of international justice per se; but rather a 
rejection of the continuing power plays by the more powerful nations in 
the international community (McNamee 2014:6). The perception remains 
that in spite of a number of conf licts throughout the world, to date the 
4 See Art. 3 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
5 African countries did not in fact oppose the prosecution of Al-Bashir by the ICC. 
Their concern related to the timing of issuing of the arrest warrants which coincided 
with regional peacebuilding efforts (Murithi and Ngari 2011:9).
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ICC has focussed exclusively on Africa (Murithi 2012:4).6 This has created 
a wariness amongst African leaders regarding the agenda of the ICC. 
It has been argued that Africa is being singled out since the ICC cannot risk 
alienating its biggest financial supporters, and Africa lacks the diplomatic 
and economic power of other countries (Murithi 2012:5). This argument, 
however, loses traction if one considers the fact that a number of the 
prosecutions and investigations before the Court was due to self-referral by 
African states. Uganda, The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and 
the Central African Republic are cases in point (Hansen 2013).
Mueller (2014:29) argues that the move away from support of the ICC 
can be attributed to changes in the political situation and weaknesses in 
the rule of law. She argues that ratification and compliance was easy as 
long as support of the ICC carries little political risk. The history of the 
ICC investigations shows that the ICC initially concentrated on non-state 
actors and one side of the conf lict (Mueller 2014:29).7 In its 12 years of 
existence there have only been two successful prosecutions. Politicians can 
be forgiven for thinking that they would not become vulnerable to the ICC 
since it is an accepted rule in international customary law that a serving 
head of state is immune from the jurisdiction of other states (Akande 
2008:1). Although Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute provides that such 
immunities do not prevent the ICC from instituting prosecution, to date 
serving heads of state have been relatively protected from prosecution.8 
Since their election as president and deputy-president, both Kenyatta and 
6 There are however sufficient reasons to pursue the indictments and statistically the 
number of atrocities in Africa makes it a natural conclusion that the focus of prosecution 
will be on Africa. It is also of interest that it is the governments that are complaining and 
not the victims – see in this regard the discussion in Du Plessis et al 2013.
7 The conflict in Northern Uganda serves as example. In 2003 the Government of 
Uganda referred the conflict to the ICC. The chief prosecutor issued arrest warrants 
for five members of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) but chose not to issue warrants 
for members of the Ugandan Army. The crimes committed by the LRA were deemed of 
‘higher gravity than those allegedly committed by the Ugandan Army’ (Malu 2015:87).
8 A notable exception is the indictment by the ICTY of Slobodan Milosevic while he was a 
serving head of state.
87
Withdrawal from the International Criminal Court
Ruto have been successful in mobilising the AU and challenging the ICC on 
legal grounds,9 thereby frustrating the ICC’s ability to go ahead with their 
cases (Mueller 2014:26).
However, the ICC’s investigation of Kenya dramatically increased the 
political risk factor for other countries (Mueller 2014:29). With the high 
level of conf lict in Africa and the involvement of both state and non-state 
actors, African leaders could clearly see that they were not as immune from 
the ICC as previously believed. Soon after the ICC prosecutor named the 
Kenyan defendants in December 2010, the AU came out in support of a 
deferment of the investigations, ostensibly to allow Kenya the opportunity 
to prosecute its cases in its own courts (Mueller 2014:31). When this proved 
unsuccessful,10 the AU proposed a resolution for African states to pull 
out of the ICC. This was followed by a special summit in October 2012 
to discuss the possible pull-out of African countries. The AU painted the 
ICC as an ‘anti-African, colonial, western institute’ (Mueller 2014:32–35). 
The AU even went as far as submitting a motion to the UNSC that all 
African heads of state should be given immunity from prosecution, which 
was not accepted by the UNSC (Mueller 2014:37).11
One of the objectives of the ICC is to end impunity, and the hostility towards 
the ICC raises concerns regarding the fate of other human rights treaties and 
international criminal justice in general (Mueller 2014:26). One need only 
look at the relative impotence of the African Human Rights Commission, 
who can only make recommendations, and the lack of political will in 
9 Kenyatta challenged the admissibility of the trial before the ICC, arguing that Kenya was 
undergoing extensive legal and judicial reforms which would allow for the domestic 
prosecution of these trials. When this was unsuccessful he challenged the jurisdiction of 
the ICC on the grounds that the severity of the alleged crimes against humanity did not 
meet the required threshold as required in terms of the Rome Statute. This challenge also 
failed (Mueller 2014:26).
10 Due to its previous refusal, human rights bodies and victims did not trust the about-face 
of Kenya in expressing its desire to handle its own prosecutions (Mueller 2014:31).
11 Seven members voted in favour of the resolution while eight abstained. For a 
comprehensive discussion on the reasons for abstention see United Nations Security 
Council 2013.
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implementing their suggestions. Desmond Tutu, prominent South African 
Nobel Peace Prize winner and human rights activist, stated that ‘African 
leaders behind the move to extract the continent from the jurisdiction of 
the [ICC] [w]ere ... seeking a licence to kill, maim and oppress their people 
without consequence’ (Mueller 2014:37). The message of the ICC is that 
serious international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes cannot be tolerated. This is an important rationale for 
international criminal justice – an intolerance for impunity should act as 
a deterrent. This requires that the international structures put in place to 
enforce international jurisdiction remain credible (Kastner 2012:10).
It is by ending impunity that the ICC assists emerging democracies in 
strengthening their own laws, thereby supporting respect for human 
rights (Murithi and Ngari 2011:18). The continued tension between 
the AU, the UNSC and the ICC will necessarily filter down to these 
emerging democracies. Tensions are most visible in the African context 
and consequently it has been argued that ‘the impact of the ICC on global 
justice will be determined in Africa’ (Murithi and Ngari 2011:18). Where 
most human rights treaties do not have any means of enforcement, the 
Rome Statute is enforceable. This in itself should mean that countries 
should be compelled to comply with the indictments. The challenge arises 
when a body is dependent on the co-operation of a government to fulfil 
its mandate yet it is that same government that stands to be investigated. 
Without the political will of its State Parties the ICC cannot function 
effectively. It frequently happens that those accused of atrocities in civil 
wars end up as leaders in the post-conf lict governments (Murithi 2012:5). 
Some African countries’ blatant disregard for the actions taken by the 
ICC does not bode well for its credibility.
This raises the important question: Does Africa have an alternative solution? 
The mandate of the AU ostensibly complements that of the ICC – both strive 
to end impunity and hold violators accountable. The problem lies with their 
divergent approaches, which is not surprising since the AU is a political 
body and the ICC a judicial body (Murithi 2012:7). This difference also 
reiterates the dichotomy between attaining justice versus attaining peace. 
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The one does not necessarily include the other.12 By entering the 
international arena the judiciary is effectively entering the arena of politics, 
something that usually does not fall within its ambit. The ICC’s mandate 
does not include the pursuit of peace and reconciliation (Murithi and 
Ngari 2011:2). Courts are by nature retributive and generally not focussed 
on reconciliation. With its colonial history it is also not surprising that the 
AU does not want to expose its political leaders to what is perceived as a 
mainly European judicial system.13 The history of the African countries is 
an important consideration in the reasons for the violent atrocities taking 
place. Merely prosecuting a handful of individuals does not address the 
deep-rooted structural and socio-economic concerns that often drive the 
violence (Murithi and Ngari 2011:9). One could ask whether the pursuit of 
justice is feasible if it is to the exclusion of lasting peace.
This raises the question of what alternatives are available as opposed 
to prosecution before the ICC. Must offenders in fact be prosecuted? 
A number of international criminal treaties impose a duty on signatory 
states to prosecute individuals. These treaties are limited in application to 
either narrowly defined actions or to atrocities committed in international 
armed conf licts, thereby excluding the most prevalent cases of non-
international armed conf licts (Scharf 1996:43–46). The same cannot be 
said for a number of general international human rights conventions. 
They do not impose any duty to prosecute, only to ‘ensure the rights 
enumerated therein’ (Scharf 1996:48).
12 Some argue that peace and justice are not necessarily mutually exclusive either. An initial 
focus on restorative justice before other avenues of justice should enable a country to 
consolidate peacebuilding efforts. Overemphasis on one at the expense of the other does 
not lead to lasting stability (Murithi and Ngari 2011:8 and 10). 
13 Tladi (2009:66) postulates that the argument against imperialist interference has lost 
ground considering that the values espoused by the ICC, such as intolerance against 
impunity, have been ‘appropriated by African culture’. He argues that one cannot simply 
ignore the fact that 33 of the 54 AU member states have ratified the Rome Statute and that 
the values enshrined in the Rome statute have also been included in the AU Constitutive 
Act. He postulates that ‘the time has come to accept the values under consideration are not 
only part of European heritage but the common heritage of mankind, including Africa’. 
90
Michelle Nel and Vukile Ezrom Sibiya
Other possible alternatives?
Amnesty
Countries have resorted to a number of measures in trying to bring an end 
to violence and move towards peace. Transition may often only be possible 
where the needs of the state to balance a delicate political process and 
resolve the conf lict can be reconciled with the international community’s 
need to exact justice from the perpetrators of international crimes 
(Naqvi 2003:583). This cannot be done if the perpetrators of systematic 
human rights abuses are not held accountable (Mennecke 2008:1). Should 
accountability necessarily mean prosecution? The granting of amnesty, 
an option not deemed acceptable in the context of serious international 
crimes, has long been in use to facilitate conf lict resolution and ‘create 
conditions for reconciliation’ (Arsanjani 1999:65). Several countries have 
offered domestic amnesty to perpetrators of a number of atrocities14 and in 
some cases the amnesties were supported by the UN as a means of restoring 
peace and democracy. Amnesties are usually negotiated in an agreement or 
legislated to form part of national laws (Naqvi 2003:583).
Would the granting of amnesty to perpetrators impact an ICC investigation? 
It is required in principle, when negotiating amnesty, to exclude amnesties 
for international crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC (Murithi 
and Ngari 2001:5). A number of provisions in the Rome Statute clearly 
shows that the ICC is not in favour of amnesties (Arsanjani 1999:67).15 
The reality is, however, that this may often be the only way to draw actors 
from opposite sides of the conf lict to a dialogue enabling a resolution to 
the conf lict. The Rome Statute does not specifically prohibit amnesties and 
until the ICC has ruled on the matter, it remains debatable whether the ICC 
would recognise a domestic amnesty law granting amnesty to a perpetrator 
suspected of serious international crimes. Looking at the main objective 
of the ICC as facilitating the end of impunity, amnesty would seemingly 
14 Scharf (1996:41) refers inter alia to Argentina, Cambodia, Chile, Haiti and South Africa.
15 See in this context inter alia the Preamble of the Rome Statute, Article 1 and Article 17.
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not be conducive towards this end. National amnesty laws would also not 
bind the ICC as an international organisation which bases its resolutions 
on treaty law (Naqvi 2010).
Domestic and local trials
Even where countries have shown their apparent willingness to protect 
human rights by signing the Rome Statute, it does not necessarily follow 
that the domestic courts are equipped to prosecute perpetrators of violent 
atrocities. Very few African countries have in fact adopted the Rome Statute 
into their domestic law. Without such domestication perpetrators cannot 
be prosecuted on a national level, leaving the ICC with no option but to 
institute prosecution. It also shows a clear lack of political will by African 
leaders to protect human rights and end impunity.16
Africa has however shown that prosecution of the most serious crimes is 
indeed possible as evidenced by the Habré trial in Senegal. This trial was 
the first African-led prosecution, incorporating a blend of international 
and domestic laws (Sirleaf 2016:16). Despite experiencing financial 
difficulties, deposed Chadian President Hisséne Habré was convicted on 
30 May 2016 by the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese 
court system for crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
torture, sexual violence and rape (Human Rights Watch 2016b, Tladi 2009:67). 
He was sentenced to life in prison. Justice is therefore possible if the political 
will exists, but remains difficult to obtain. Habré’s victims waited 25 years 
for justice.
Domestic courts may not be the only solution. Africa has a rich tradition 
of traditional justice mechanisms, which are often used by communities to 
handle disagreements (Muruthi and Ngari 2011:6). Can these traditional 
mechanisms, however, sufficiently address the most serious of international 
crimes? There are some examples where traditional mechanisms have been 
successful in attaining justice and also facilitating reconciliation. One such 
example can be found in the Gacaca trials held in Rwanda after the 1994 
16 For a more detailed discussion see Institute for Security Studies 2009.
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genocide killed close to 1 000 000 people. These trials ran parallel to the 
processes of the ICTR and the domestic court system. To a certain extent 
these courts functioned as a type of truth and reconciliation commission in 
that victims had the opportunity to find out what happened to their family 
members during these trials. Where perpetrators convinced the courts of 
their repentance, punishments tended to be more lenient than in the case 
of those who did not repent, and in many instances the perpetrators were 
even allowed to return and reintegrate into their communities without 
incurring punishment. More than 1.2 million cases were tried in 12 000 
courts compared to the approximately 63 cases handled by the ICTR.17
Corey and Joireman (2004), however, argue that the Gacaca trials did not 
facilitate conciliation but in fact emphasised the ethnic divide and pursued 
inequitable justice since they only prosecuted genocide and not war crimes. 
For a number of years this has indeed been the pervasive opinion. Since the 
Gacaca trials ended in 2013, studies evaluating the impact of the trials on 
justice and conf lict resolution are only now emerging. Although the main 
focus of the trials seemed to be on restorative justice, sentences incurred did 
in fact also ref lect punitive aims. In spite of severe criticism of the process 
and outcomes over the years, Brehm and others (2014:346–347) find that 
the Gacaca trials rather encourage the use of innovative means to deal with 
lesser offences in a number of social contexts. Whether community-based 
trials are a viable method of dealing with mass atrocities remains a matter 
for debate, but the Gacaca trials can be regarded as ‘a powerful response to 
mass crime and an important element in the struggle to address society-
wide tragedy and move forward’ (Brehm et al. 2014:347).
The African regional courts as an alternative?
On paper Africa has a good track record in the development of human 
rights documents to protect its people. Even during the reign of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), an organisation known for its 
17 See the discussion on the UN Background information on the justice and reconciliation 
process in Rwanda (United Nations 2016) for a detailed history on the Rwanda tribunal.
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non-interventionist approach, a number of regional conventions were 
adopted as part of its legislative framework. The focus on human rights 
protection was developed further since the OAU partnered with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and culminated with 
the evolution of the OAU into the AU (Mubiala 2002:35–59). For the first 
time, the Constitutive Act of an African regional organisation asserted 
a right to intervene in other countries where the AU Assembly agrees that 
the breaches are grave enough to warrant intervention (Viljoen 2004:349). 
One would therefore expect no hesitation in holding perpetrators accountable 
for serious violations of the human rights they reportedly support. 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, modelled on the 
UN Human Rights Committee, was appointed as custodian responsible for 
human rights compliance in Africa. At its inception, it was the only body in 
Africa tasked with the promotion and protection of human rights. As part 
of its mandate its function includes consideration of complaints filed by 
various individuals and NGOs. These complaints are lodged in the form of 
communications which are usually considered during closed sessions and 
are of a confidential nature (African Union 2009).18 In instances of dire 
emergency, the Commission would inform the Chair of the AU and request 
an in-depth study of the situation, or alternatively a fact-finding mission.
Unfortunately the decisions taken by the Commission are regarded as non-
binding since the Commission is at most a quasi-judicial body. Decisions 
cannot be published without the authority of the AU Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government. The African Charter furthermore did not 
provide any enforceable remedies to track compliance by states with these 
decisions. The member states were obliged to give bi-annual reports on the 
state of human rights within their country, but few states complied and the 
Commission had no authority to enforce this.
18 A communication is a ‘document submitted by a State Party, a Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO) with Observer Status before the African Commission or an 
individual alleging violations of the provisions of the African Charter by a State of the 
African Union’ (African Union 2009). 
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This is set to change. In the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, adopted 
in 2010, part four creates a relationship between the Commission and the 
African Court on Human and People’s Rights. Rule 114 states that the court 
now complements the protective mandate of the Commission and allows 
the Commission to approach the Court where a country is unwilling to 
comply with the recommendations made by the Commission in addressing 
serious human rights violations. Although this is a step in the right 
direction, the African Court still lacks international criminal jurisdiction 
to prosecute serious violations. It would probably be able to make an order 
compelling a member state to address the concerns of the Commission, but 
it is still unclear to what extent this order would be enforceable.
It is necessary to make a brief overview of the history of the African Court 
in order to understand the reluctance towards accepting such a court as the 
solution to the prosecution of atrocities.
The genocide in Rwanda and wide-spread human rights abuses in Sierra Leone 
clearly showed the need for Africans to act against atrocities committed in 
Africa. Although ad hoc Tribunals were created, the prevalence of conflicts 
and the resultant abuses show the clear need for a permanent African 
court. Unfortunately this was not always the accepted mindset. Historically 
African leaders have shown a reluctance to submit themselves to a court’s 
jurisdiction. In 1963 the founding conference of the OAU rejected the draft 
Charter that provided for a Court of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration 
(Udombana 2003:819). Their decision to rather create the Commission of 
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration in pursuit of facilitating peaceful 
dispute settlement is an indication of African leaders’ preference for the use 
of quasi-judicial bodies rather than courts with enforceable jurisdiction.19 
The Commission never became operational.
The next opportunity for creating a pan-Africanist court once again 
met with failure when the OAU refused to establish the African Human 
19 Udombana (2003:818) postulates that African dispute settlement favours ‘consensus and 
amicable dispute settlement, frowning upon the adversarial and adjudicative procedures 
common to Western legal systems’.
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Rights Court in accordance with the African Charter, settling instead on 
the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, who may only 
now potentially have the ability to enforce its recommendations. As stated 
above, it is unclear to what extent and what form the enforcement will take.
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR) on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights was adopted as a protocol to the African Charter in June 
1998 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Ouagadougou, 
creating the African court. There was however some reluctance by African 
states in accepting the Court’s jurisdiction. The Protocol was adopted in 
1998 but only came into operation six years later in 2004 after 15 states 
had ratified it. As of the beginning of 2014 only 27 out of a possible 
54 AU states have ratified the protocol. The slow ratification would 
seemingly indicate a continued reluctance by African nations to subject 
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.20 This does not bode well for a 
replacement of the ICC – which in fact has more African countries having 
ratified its treaty. The African court held its first public hearing only in 
2012, eight years after coming into operation.
ACHPR is not the only court envisaged for Africa. The Constitutive Act of 
the AU makes provision for an African Court of Justice, the main judicial 
body of the AU (Udombana 2003:816).21 The idea was that this court would 
interpret the Constitutive Act and resolve disputes between states (Pityana 
2003). This court never came into existence. Its function is currently being 
fulfilled by the ACHPR.
20 The reluctance of African states in ratifying the Protocol partly stems from a lack of 
understanding of the role of the Court in their domestic jurisdictions. They seem reluctant 
to accept extra-territorial jurisdiction and fear that an African court may in fact undermine 
their domestic courts (Pityana 2004:123 and 129).
21 The Constitutive Act did not elaborate on the composition of the Court, its mandate 
or function. 
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Just as the development of the ACHPR was gaining momentum, the 
Chairperson of the AU Assembly at the time, President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, revived the idea of a merger between the ACHPR and the 
African Court of Justice (Sceats 2009:4). The suggestion was accepted 
and in July 2004 the AU Assembly agreed to the merger. As soon as the 
new court is established, it will be known as the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights (ACJHR) and will be the main judicial organ of the 
AU (Sceats 2009:5). The Protocol establishing the court was adopted 
in July 2008 at the 11th AU Summit, but to date has only been ratified 
by five of the required 15 countries. Ref lecting on the rocky history of 
the establishment of a pan-Africanist court, it remains doubtful that 
the court will become operational in the near future. In the interim the 
ACHPR remains operational until such time that the pending cases can 
be transferred to the human rights section of the African Court of Justice 
(Sceats 2009:6).22
The new ACJHR will have jurisdiction to hear cases brought against 
member states for the infringement on human rights. Where violations 
are found, the court would be able to issue binding judgments and could 
order compensation for the victims. They will also be able to issue advisory 
opinions on general questions of human rights law (Sceats 2009:6). Although 
the focus of the court originally was on human rights, the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government requested a study into the implications 
of extending the court’s jurisdiction to criminal matters in 2009. 
The subsequent Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (the Malabo Protocol) was 
adopted in June 2014 by the AU Heads of State and Government meeting 
22 This interim measure was taken due to lobbying efforts of a number of NGOs who feared 
that human rights would have no judicial protection while waiting for the new court to 
come into existence. The ACHPR has both contentious and advisory jurisdiction, hearing 
cases and disputes relating to the interpretation and application of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Protocol as well as other human rights instruments 
ratified by its state parties. As of March 2017 the Court has received 124 applications 
since its first judgement in 2009. It has finalised 32 cases. Their website can be accessed at 
<en.african-court.org>.
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in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. The Malabo Protocol proposes to extend 
the jurisdiction of the ACJHR to international as well as transnational 
crimes (Amnesty International 2016).
If given criminal jurisdiction, the ACJHR will have an advantage that 
its European and inter-American counterparts and even the ICC do not 
have. Article 28 of the Statute of the ACJHR, as well as the preamble of 
the Protocol of the Statute, reiterates the Constitutive Act of the AU which 
provides for a Court of Justice with the jurisdiction to interpret and apply 
the Constitutive Act and ‘all other Treaties adopted within the framework 
of the Union’.23 The other international courts are limited to interpreting 
only one treaty.
A negative aspect however is that complaints are only possible against 
states and not against individuals. Consequently it may be extremely 
difficult for those most in need of assistance to bring a matter before the 
Court. The Court only allows direct access to member states and a limited 
number of African NGOs. All other NGOs as well as individuals will only 
be able to gain access if the State against whom the action is based signs 
a special declaration acceding to the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the 
case (Sceats 2009:2). It would not be surprising if few, if any, states actually 
grant such permission, especially seen against their perceived reluctance to 
subject themselves to the court’s jurisdiction.
By implementing and supporting an African court with jurisdiction over 
international crimes, African countries will be a step closer to ensuring 
that the ICC will not prosecute Africans. Since the ICC’s jurisdiction is 
complementary, intervention will only take place where the domestic 
courts fail to establish credible avenues for prosecuting serious crimes 
(Muruthi and Ngari 2011:3). The actual exercise of the complementary 
jurisdiction may potentially create tension between the ICC and the 
African court. Article 46 A bis of the Malabo Protocol immunises serving 
heads of state and government, or anybody acting in such capacity for the 
23 Emphasis added.
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tenure of their office. This includes senior state officials. These immunities 
include functional and official immunities as provided under customary 
international law and deemed necessary in the maintenance of international 
peace and co-operation (Sirleaf 2016:11). Whereas the Rome Statute allows 
for the indictment of sitting heads of state, the African court will only have 
jurisdiction once their term ends. Considering the indefinite terms of tenure 
of some heads of state it remains to be seen whether the ICC will wait on the 
African court. Doing so could lead to justice denied for a number of victims.
Currently the complementary nature of the ICC’s jurisdiction does not 
apply to regional jurisdiction, only domestic, but it would be possible to 
amend the Rome Statute in this regard or reach an agreement between the 
two courts (McNamee 2014:13). The ideal would be that the African Court 
address serious crimes and that referral to the ICC only takes place where 
the African court could not adequately redress the wrongs (McNamee 
2014:13).
Conclusion
The strong anti-ICC stance of the AU has placed pressure on African 
signatories of the Rome Statute to bow under the regional pressure and not 
co-operate with the ICC (Weldehaimanot 2011:219; Tladi 2009:61). Africa’s 
failure to hand over Al-Bashir is a case in point. The ICC’s insistence on 
executing the arrest warrant has prompted the AU to discuss withdrawal at 
a number of summit meetings, culminating in Burundi, Gambia and South 
Africa indicating their intention to withdraw from the ICC.
After the UN Human Rights Council resolved to create a commission 
of inquiry into alleged human rights abuses, Burundi sent their formal 
notification of withdrawal to the UN, accusing powerful countries of using 
the ICC to punish African leaders (Human Rights Watch 2016a). Gambia’s 
announced withdrawal was subsequently revoked by the newly elected 
President Barrow (Keppler 2017b).
On 19 October 2016 South Africa seemed set to withdraw when the Minister 
of International Relations and Co-operation signed the notice of withdrawal 
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from the ICC, informing the UN that South Africa’s obligations to peaceful 
conflict resolution was incompatible with the UN’s. The withdrawal would 
take effect one year after receipt of the notice (Nichols 2016). After the 
Gauteng High Court however ruled that South Africa’s initial process of 
withdrawal was unconstitutional and therefore invalid, South Africa had to 
issue a notice to revoke their withdrawal (Staff Reporter 2017).
These proposed withdrawals raised the spectre of a possible mass exodus. 
The AU had made no secret of its acrimony towards the ICC. At the recent 
28th Annual Summit of Heads of State at the end of January 2017 in Addis 
Ababa, the AU managed to adopt an ICC withdrawal strategy. The strategy 
is regarded by some as a ‘political message’ to the ICC (Du Plessis 2017). 
Although the strategy is non-binding since the AU is not a state party and 
cannot make decisions for the collective group, it is of serious concern that the 
AU has reached this stage of contemplating mass withdrawal without having 
a permanent alternative in place.24 Membership to the ICC, once regarded 
with optimism, has become a serious divisive issue in Africa. Burundi is still 
set to withdraw and South Africa’s revocation of their withdrawal was not 
due to a change of heart – its constitutional processes prevented withdrawal 
and its stance towards the ICC remains. On the other side of the issue is 
Nigeria, Senegal and Cape Verde who reiterate that the ICC still has an 
important role to play on the continent. These countries have lodged formal 
reservations to the decision adopted by the heads of state. Malawi, Tanzania, 
Tunisia and Zambia have requested more time to study the strategy. It is 
against this divisive background that now, more than ever, the AU must act 
decisively and not pay mere lip-service to its ‘unflinching commitment to 
combating impunity and promoting democracy, the rule of law and good 
governance throughout the Continent …’ (Weldehaimanot 2011:214).
24 According to Human Rights Watch, the strategy of ICC withdrawal is not in fact a clear 
call for mass withdrawal. It is a call for further research and consideration of the idea 
of a collective withdrawal. The strategy also reiterates the AU’s concerns regarding its 
relationship with the UNSC and once again calls for an amendment of the Rome Statute 
to exempt sitting heads of state from prosecution. It does however provide information to 
states on how to withdraw from the ICC (Keppler 2017a).
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